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The Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s stance on the revolution and war
Tadeusz A. Olszański
Volodymyr (secular name Viktor Sabodan), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, the 
head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which recognises the honorary primacy of the 
Moscow Patriarchate, died on 5 July 2014 at the age of 79. He was replaced by Metropolitan 
Onufry (secular name Orest Berezovsky), aged 70. The fact that this representative of the mo-
derate trend, far from politics, was elected signifies that the UOC’s previous policy will be con-
tinued in the coming years: strengthening the Church’s independence without questioning 
its canonical bonds with Moscow. Metropolitan Onufry’s task is to wait out the hard times, 
rather than to embark upon an active policy. 
The political developments this year have significantly weakened pro-Russian views and sen-
timents among the Ukrainian public, including members of the UOC. On the other hand, 
they have also contributed to the radicalisation of views within firmly pro-Russian circles. 
The hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have distanced themselves from these de-
velopments. The reasons for this included a lack of unity among them as regards this issue, 
as well as the leadership crisis linked to Metropolitan Volodymyr’sillness. The main problems 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is facing today are as follows: meeting the expectations of 
those of its members who hold patriotic views (mainly the younger generation) without at 
the same time antagonising its numerous members who are pro-Russian; and also continuing 
to disregard the Kyiv Patriarchate and maintaining bonds with the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Therefore, we may expect the UOC to continue avoiding taking a clear stance on the present 
conflict, instead focusing on charity. 
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
– basic information
Since the early 1990s Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
has been divided into two main branches: 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is part 
of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and 
is recognised by the other Orthodox Church-
es, and the independent Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, which is unrecognised 
by the Orthodox world. The latter branch rep-
resents a patriotic (at times nationalist) and 
anti-Russian approach, and has often become 
openly involved in politics. In turn the former, 
often described with the addition of ‘Moscow 
Patriarchate’ (by its opponents) or defined as 
‘the canonical Church’ (by its supporters) makes 
very infrequent and cautious statements con-
cerning political issues, supports the Ukrainian 
state, and distances itself from nationalism and 
anti-Russian views. There is a rivalry between 
two factions within this Church: one would 
like closer bonds with Moscow (up to the pa-
triarchal Exarchate status being reinstated) 
re-established, while the other wants total ca-
nonical independence (autocephaly). 
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The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is the only Or-
thodox Church in Ukraine to have been deemed 
canonically legal by the global Orthodox com-
munity. This means, for example, that only the 
sacraments administered by its priests are rec-
ognised as valid by other Orthodox Churches 
and other Churches participating in the ecu-
menical dialogue. Until 1990, this Church was 
a patriarchal Exarchate, being part of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church, albeit with some auton-
omy. Since then it has been a fully indepen-
dent Church as part of the ROC. It is headed 
by the metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, 
who is elected independently by the bishops 
of Ukraine and is then blessed by the patriarch 
of Moscow and All-Russia. The metropolitan of 
Kyiv is a member of the Holy Synod of the ROC, 
and is the second most important official there 
after the patriarch of Moscow, which makes 
it difficult for the patriarch to take any steps 
against the UOC. 
According to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s 
own calculations1, at the beginning of 2013 it 
was formed of 51 eparchies (dioceses), 11,393 
parishes, 291 monasteries and convents and 18 
education facilities, including 4 with academic 
status (it is thus independent of Russian dio-
ceses in this context). It had 73 bishops, 10,187 
priests and 3,632 monks and nuns. The UOC’s 
structures publish 82 newspapers and 40 mag-
azines, host 18 radio and 40 TV shows, and 
run 349 websites. The estimated number of its 
lay members ranges between 6 and 9 million2; 
however, no reliable data is available (as with 
followers of other religions in Ukraine). The 
UOC has structures and followers all over the 
country, but mostly in the southern, eastern 
and central regions. In turn, the ‘national’ reli-
gions, i.e. the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv 
Patriarchate (which also has significant influ-
1 Доклад митрополита Киевского и всея Украины Вла-
димира на Архиерейском Соборе Русской Православ-
ной Церкви, www.patriarchia/ru/db/print/2772214.
html; accessed on 10 September 2014.
2 Cf. Katarzyna Jarzyńska, ‘Patriarch Kirill’s game over 
Ukraine,’ OSW Commentary, no. 144, 14 August 2014.
ence in central Ukraine) and the Ukrainian Greek 
Catholic Church are predominant in western 
Ukraine. Thus the UOC has a clearly better or-
ganisational potential than its main competitor, 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarch-
ate (29 eparchies, around 40 parishes and 40 
bishops; no reliable data is available concerning 
the number of priests and Church members). 
Furthermore, it also seriously contributes to the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s potential, which has 
a total of 247 eparchies, around 31,000 parish-
es, 345 bishops and 29,000 priests. 
Two opposing trends can be observed within 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: gaining au-
tocephaly (full canonical independence from 
Moscow) and re-establishing closer bonds with 
the Moscow Patriarchate. The former trend is 
mostly supported by younger hierarchs, and 
the latter by representatives of the elder gen-
eration. In addition to these, there is a strong 
faction which wants to preserve the status quo. 
Metropolitan Volodymyr was the most promi-
nent representative of this faction, and the new 
metropolitan, Onufry, also supports it. The ‘au-
tocephalous’ or ‘pro-Ukrainian’ faction is head-
ed by Metropolitan Sofronii of Cherkasy (secu-
lar name Dmytro Dmytruk, born in 1940); and 
one of the closest aides of the deceased Met-
ropolitan Volodymyr, Metropolitan Alexander 
of Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky and Vyshneve (sec-
ular name Oleksandr Drabynko, born in 1977). 
The pro-Moscow faction is led by Metropolitan 
Agafangel of Odessa and Izmail (secular name 
Oleksiy Savvin, born in 1938) and Metropolitan 
Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol (secular name 
Dmytro Shukalo, born in 1951). 
Onufry is non-partisan – he will seek rec-
onciliation, although not unification, of 
the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. His task is not to 
make changes, but rather to wait out what 
is a difficult time for the Orthodox Church.
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The change of the Church’s leader
The death of Metropolitan Volodymyr was not 
a surprise; he had been seriously ill for two 
years, and he had not managed the Church, 
not even formally, as of February 2014. He was 
replaced by Metropolitan Onufry of Chernivt-
si and Bukovyna as a ‘guardian of the throne’ 
(a deputy, locum tenens). On 13 August, he was 
elected metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine. 
The new metropolitan was elected very quickly, 
on the first possible day (after 40 days of strict 
mourning), although the UOC’s statute envis-
ages a period of as much as three months for 
this procedure. This means that the balance of 
powers was clear, and that Metropolitan Onu-
fry was initially approved as a candidate by the 
Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Kirill. How-
ever, the vote was not unanimous: 48 out of 74 
bishops backed Onufry as a candidate during 
the secret ballot. Patriarch Kirill gave his bless-
ing to him on the same day, thus approving 
the Ukrainian bishops’ decision. The election of 
metropolitan Onufry, who is advanced in age, 
was expected. He was indicated by Metropoli-
tan Volodymyr as his successor, he has earned 
respect as a monk and a priest, and he is 
non-partisan – he does not belong to either the 
Kyiv or the Moscow faction inside the UOC. It is 
thus expected that he will seek reconciliation, 
although not unification, of Ukrainian Ortho-
doxy. Like his predecessor, he is focused on the 
spiritual aspect of the Church’s activity, has no 
political ambitions and is unwilling to express 
his opinion on political issues. Metropolitan 
Onufry is expected to be a transitional primate. 
His task is not to make any radical changes, but 
rather to wait out what is a difficult time for the 
Orthodox Church, and also to lead Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy to the Ecumenical Council, which is 
bound to begin in 2016. 
If media reports are accurate3, Metropolitan 
Antonii of Boryspil and Brovary (secular name 
Ivan Pakanych, born in 1967) and Archbishop 
Simeon of Vinnytsia and Mohyliv-Podilskyi (sec-
ular name Volodymyr Shostatsky, born in 1962) 
were the other candidates in addition to Onufry. 
Archbishop Simeon’s candidacy seems unlikely; 
this provincial hierarch is not a member of the 
UOC’s Synod or even a metropolitan, and claims 
that President Petro Poroshenko insisted on the 
election of Simeon are mere speculation. Poro-
shenko, who has already on several occasions 
participated in UOC councils as a representative 
of the laity, given the present situation, needs 
a Church leader whose authority is unquestion-
able, and not a new and inexperienced man. In 
turn, Metropolitan Antonii, who has served as 
the first vicar of Kyiv Metropolis and has been 
the Director of Church Affairs since 2012, was 
a serious candidate. He belongs to the pro-Mos-
cow faction, and he was promoted as a candi-
date by Metropolitans Agafangel and Hilarion. 
Considering the new metropolitan’s advanced 
age, Antonii is likely to keep both positions and 
his previous influence. 
It cannot be ruled out that the decision to con-
vene the bishops’ council was consulted be-
hind the scenes with Poroshenko, as was the 
candidacy of Metropolitan Onufry (such con-
sultations are part of the Orthodox Church’s 
tradition, an element of the Church/state ‘sym-
phony’). Although the president of Ukraine did 
not participate in the enthronisation of the 
UOC’s new primate, he received him one day 
after the ceremony, on 18 June. 
3 Cf., for example, Екатерина Щеткина, ‘На месте - 
стой!’, Зеркало недели, 15 August 2014.
A great part of priests in the Donbas 
backed the separatists more or less open-
ly. The remaining part of the UOC has re-
frained from supporting any of the sides, 
focusing instead on charity.
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The Church on the new situation 
in Ukraine
The ‘Revolution of Dignity’ initiated by the 
Maidan protests came as a surprise and chal-
lenge to the UOC. The Church, which was closely 
linked to the Yanukovych regime (he demonstrat-
ed his religiousness ostentatiously), hostile to 
European moral liberalism and opposed Ukraine 
establishing closer links with Western structures, 
could not join the movement of young patriot-
ic liberals. When the Kyiv Patriarchate granted 
almost official support to the Maidan in the 
last days of November 2013, the UOC could not 
back the movement for precisely this reason. 
Thus the unexpectedly strong religious aspect 
of the Maidan remained within the domain of 
Greek-Catholic and Kyiv Patriarchate (and also 
Roman Catholic) priests, although members of 
the UOC were also numerous among the pro-
testers. Priests from the canonical Church also 
appeared there, but their presence was less vis-
ible. Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa openly 
condemned the Euromaidan, and Metropolitan 
Hilarion also criticised it. However, the influence 
of UOC priests on soldiers from the Internal 
Troops (currently the National Guard) and other 
law enforcement agencies reduced the blood-
shed on several occasions during the clashes in 
January and February this year. 
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church had to deal with 
a leadership crisis at that time. The terminally ill 
Metropolitan Volodymyr was unable to perform 
his duties; the ‘pro-Moscow’ (and pro-Yanu-
kovych) faction was paralysed after Metropolitan 
Agafangel’s unsuccessful attempt to take power 
in the Church in 2013, and the ‘pro-Kyiv’ faction 
feared it could be accused of ‘conspiring’ with 
the Kyiv Patriarchate. Since the Church needed to 
have a legitimate leader, it was decided to elect 
a ‘guardian of the throne’. Metropolitan Onufry, 
a compromise candidate who shuns politics, was 
elected to this position. 
The situation changed when the Russian Federa-
tion annexed Crimea and war later broke out in 
eastern Ukraine. The hierarchs of the UOC would 
not accept a reduction of their ‘canonical territo-
ry’, nor could they disregard the sudden increase 
in patriotic sentiments and the failure of the so-
called ‘Russian Spring’ in March and April 2014. 
The Kyiv Metropolis is finding it easy to cope with 
the situation since the Moscow Patriarchate has 
not as yet made any moves to detach the Crime-
an eparchies (Jankoy, Feodosia and Simferopol) 
from the UOC4. Regardless of the canonical 
complexity of this solution, the hierarchs of the 
ROC must be aware of the fact that such a move 
would have caused an open split within the UOC.
A great part of priests in the Donbas backed the 
separatists more or less openly, giving special 
sermons for them and supporting them through 
propaganda, e.g. repeating the threats of an 
imminent “danger posed by the Banderovtsy- 
-Uniates5”, “US aggression”, etc., thus strength-
ening the civilian population’s support for the 
rebellion. In some cases priests refused to offi-
ciate at the funerals of fallen Ukrainian soldiers. 
The remaining part of the UOC refrained from 
supporting any side, focusing instead on charity, 
especially with regard to refugees. UOC priests 
serve as chaplains in the Ukrainian armed forces, 
and probably also in some volunteer battalions 
(followers of the Kyiv Patriarchate, to the extent 
that this can be determined at all, predominate 
among the member of these battalions; in oth-
ers Greek Catholics are predominant, although 
members of the UOC are also represented there 
to a sizeable degree). 
4 For more information on the ROC’s stance on these de-
velopments see Katarzyna Jarzyńska, op. cit.
5 i.e. Greek Catholic. 
The anti-Russian sentiment among a sig-
nificant part of the followers of the UOC 
is likely to last a long time. Many mem-
bers see the Church’s being ‘canonical’ as 
insignificant as compared to its national 
and political orientation.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 151
Metropolitan Onufry, who has never concealed 
his negative attitude towards European integra-
tion, has expressed very cautious opinions on 
this issue, both before and after he was put in 
charge of the Kyiv Metropolis, arguing that the 
Church is apolitical, emphasising the need to stop 
bloodshed, and avoiding taking sides. However, 
the ‘Address to the clergy, monks and all mem-
bers of the Church’ announced by the ‘electoral’ 
council on 13 August 2014 states that the UOC 
“supports the state sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of Ukraine” and includes the phrase “one, 
unified (soborna) Ukraine” (the term soborny in 
this context had thus far been used in nationalist 
rhetoric)6. None of the bishops dared to open-
ly support the Russian aggression on Ukraine. 
The Russian reaction to the ‘Revolution of Digni-
ty’ (provoking the ‘Russian Spring’, backing the 
Donbas rebellion, and finally open aggression) 
has given rise to a sudden increase in anti-Rus-
sian sentiments among the Ukrainian public, 
including the lay members and clergy of the 
UOC. Many members of this church have be-
come followers of the Kyiv Patriarchate; at least 
two parishes have changed their subordination 
(in compliance with Ukrainian law, which still 
recognises religious communes and not church 
organisations as legal subjects), and some of its 
priests have blessed and backed volunteer bat-
talions. The name of the Moscow Patriarch is no 
longer mentioned in the liturgy in some church-
6 КИЇВ. Послання Собору Єпископів УПЦ до духовен-
ства, чернецтва та усіх вірних Української Право-
славної Церкви, http://pravoslavye.org.ua, accessed on 
10 September 2014.
es (the first such instances of this had already 
been observed last winter). There must have 
been quite a number of such cases, and pressure 
from the lay members must have been strong, 
as Metropolitan Sofronii of Cherkasy and Kaniv 
gave a free hand to the priests in his eparchy7. 
The anti-Russian sentiment among a significant 
part of the followers of the UOC, and to an 
even greater extent the numerous group who 
define themselves as Orthodox Christians but 
are not linked to any Church (and are in general 
not engaged in religious practices), is like-
ly to last a long time. Many members see the 
Church’s being ‘canonical’ as insignificant com-
pared to its national and political orientation. 
Thus the Kyiv Patriarchate will gain most, and 
the threat that lay members and parish clergy 
could join the Kyiv Patriarchate on a mass scale 
will force the UOC to identify itself increasingly 
strongly with the Ukrainian state and nation. 
However, it cannot be expected that the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church will univocally sup-
port Kyiv’s pro-Western policy and hard-line 
approach towards separatism and Russia. This 
is not only because the Kyiv Patriarchate does 
this (and the UOC must be clearly distinct from 
it), but also because a significant part of its 
members in eastern Ukraine oppose Kyiv’s pol-
icy and even openly support separatism (these 
are mainly representatives of the elder genera-
tion; however, young people can also be found 
among the Russian nationalists in Donbas, who 
demonstrate their faithfulness to Moscow-based 
Orthodoxy8). The UOC cannot disregard them as 
well, nor can it ignore the fact that its priests 
and bishops, especially those from the elder 
generation, support the idea of the ‘Russian 
world’. Last but not least, even those Ukrainian 
Orthodox Christians who hold patriotic views 
are usually at least critical about the introduc-
7 Митрополит УПЦ МП Софроній: Бути у єдиній церкві 
в Україні. Чому б ні?, http://glavcom.ua/articles/22204.
html, accessed on 8 September 2014. 
8 One of the armed separatist formations is called the Rus-
sian Orthodox Army. 
People who have grown up in independent 
Ukraine and have been educated in the 
spirit of school-taught, state patriotism are 
a growing group among the members of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Young priests 
have been brought up this way as well.
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tion of ‘Western values’ in Ukraine, since these 
are associated not only with ‘new moral stan-
dards’ but also with Catholicism as a force which 
is alien and dangerous to Ukrainian identity. 
Tension between the two orientations is aug-
mented from time to time by incidents taking 
place in connection with the unfolding conflict. 
Although there are no grounds to call them 
a religious war, as representatives of the Mos-
cow Patriarchate have been claiming, at least 
one priest of the UOC has been killed (in May 
2014)9 and several churches have been shelled. 
Minor incidents have been much more numer-
ous. On the other hand, the constitution of the 
so-called Donetsk People’s Republic states that 
the UOC is the only official church on its terri-
tory. Furthermore, many priests and churches 
of the Kyiv Patriarchate and also of other reli-
gions have been harassed and attacked in the 
self-proclaimed ‘republics’ and Crimea (sever-
al Evangelical clergymen have probably been 
killed there)10. 
Possible developments
The generation gap is having an ever greater im-
pact on Ukrainian society as a whole, including 
members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 
People who have grown up in independent 
Ukraine and have been educated in the spirit of 
school-taught, state patriotism emphasising the 
country’s unity and indivisibility, and Ukraine’s 
‘perennial’ struggle for independence, but who 
also accept the multi-ethnicity of Ukrainian so-
ciety, constitute a growing group among the 
members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 
Young priests have been brought up this way 
as well. 
9 Cf. RISI report of August 2014; http://www.riss.ru/anal-
itika/3460-proyavleniya-religioznoj-neterpimosti-v-ot-
noshenii-ukrainskoj-pravoslavnoj-tserkvi-moskovskogo-pa-
triarkhata#.VBrPNoVa9-Y, accessed on 18 September 2014. 
10 Cf. Лист Патріарха Київського Філарета до Вселенсь-
кого Патріарха Варфоломія of 24 August 2014, http://
www.cerkva.info/uk /patrposlannia/5375-lyst-patr-
bartholomew.html, accessed on 2 September 2014. 
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as viewed as 
‘pro-Russian’ mainly because it has maintained 
the canonical (religious) bond with the Moscow 
Patriarchate. Furthermore, it can be agreed 
(no reliable data is available) that most of its 
members from the elder generation are eth-
nic Russians and Ukrainians with pro-Soviet/
pro-Russian views. However, people who hold 
patriotic (although not nationalist) views also 
form an essential group among its members. 
The indisputable canonical legitimacy of the 
UOC (including the validity of its sacraments) is 
more important to them than the political ori-
entation of its hierarchs. President Poroshenko 
is an active member of the laity of this Church. 
In turn, the younger generation, also among 
‘canonical’ Orthodox Christians, are mentally 
Ukrainian and expect the Church to take their 
side, and thus also the state’s side. This puts 
the hierarch in a difficult situation: on the one 
hand they need to deal with generational dis-
union among the faithful, and on the other they 
have to face the challenge posed by the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, which is more and more national-
ism-inclined. Therefore, it cannot move too far 
– neither in the ‘pro-Russian’ direction (as ex-
pected by its members from the elder genera-
tion) nor in the ‘pro-Ukrainian’ one. On the one 
hand, it cannot turn its back on its numerous 
members who took part in the protests on the 
Maidan and today are fighting in volunteer bat-
talions and the armed forces; and on the other 
it cannot allow itself to bless monuments to the 
‘Heavenly Hundred’ together with ‘patriarchal-
ists’ and be involved in similar actions. It also 
cannot turn its back on those of its members 
who are convinced that their country has fallen 
victim to ‘Fascist-US aggression’. 
This polarisation resulting from the conflict is 
lowering rather than increasing the chances 
for the unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy into 
one religious structure. This is not only because 
reconciliation is difficult between the two sides 
of the conflict, and may only be achieved one 
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generation later, but also because the secu-
lar government (especially Presidents Leonid 
Kravchuk and Viktor Yushchenko) insisted on 
this unification in the past. Another reason is 
that while the UOC expects the other Church-
es to become united with it (i.e. ‘the return of 
those who have separated’), the Kyiv Patriarch-
ate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Ortho-
dox Church, which is less influential, expect all 
churches to be united together. Another imped-
iment is posed personally by Patriarch Filaret of 
Kyiv (secular name Mykhailo Denysenko, born 
in 1929), who in 1997 was excommunicated 
by the council of the Russian Orthodox Church 
(upon a motion from Metropolitan Volodymyr), 
so any dialogue with him is ruled out. However, 
in 2013, bishops from the Kyiv Patriarchate de-
cided that when Patriarch Filaret dies, no new 
patriarch will be elected until Ukrainian Ortho-
doxy is united. This opens up the way to resum-
ing dialogue, possibly during the Ecumenical 
Council of the Eastern Church. 
Biographical notes
Onufry, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, was born Orest Berezovsky on 5 November 1944 in 
Korytne (Chernivtsi oblast) to a priest’s family of noble origin. In 1966, he left technical college in 
Chernivtsi to enrol at the Moscow Theological Seminary. He became a monk in 1971, and received 
holy orders as a priest one year later. In 1988, he graduated from the Moscow Theological Academy. 
He started working as a priest in Moscow. Later he was transferred to the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius 
(the ‘capital’ of Russian Orthodoxy), and in 1988–1990 he was father superior of the Pochaiv Lavra. 
In 1990, he was consecrated bishop and was nominated bishop of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna. Ten 
years later, he was promoted to metropolitan, and in 2007 he became head of the UOC Court. He 
has been a permanent member of the UOC Synod since 1994. 
In 1990–1992, he was a leading representative of a group of bishops who opposed the autocephaly 
of the UOC, especially the ambitions of Metropolitan Filaret (who later proclaimed himself Patriarch 
of Kyiv), and contributed to Filaret’s demotion from his position as metropolitan. Furthermore, in 
his activity as a bishop he counteracted the ambitions of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which 
was making efforts to regain its supremacy over northern Bukovyna. He has shunned publicity and 
avoided expressing opinions on politics (so he has no political experience, even inside the Church), 
but he is generally respected as a model monk and priest. 
Metropolitan Antonii of Boryspil and the first vicar of the Kyiv Metropolis was born Ivan Pakanych 
on 25 August 1967 in Chumalevo (Zakarpattia Oblast) to a peasants’ family. Already as a secondary 
school student he served as subdeacon of the Orthodox bishops of Mukacheve. After military ser-
vice, he enrolled at the Moscow Theological Seminary, from which he graduated in 1992. He was 
consecrated a monk and received holy orders as a priest a year later. In 1995, he graduated from 
the Moscow Theological Academy and later worked as a lecturer and the rector’s assistant at the 
academy. 
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In 2002, at his own request, he was transferred to Ukraine. He was in charge of the Kyiv Metropolis’s 
office. In 2006, he was consecrated bishop and nominated Bishop of Boryspil, vicar of the Kyiv Me-
tropolis. Two years later he became archbishop, and in 2013 he was promoted as metropolitan and 
first vicar of the Kyiv Metropolis. He has served as rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy, among 
other positions. In February 2012, he was nominated head of the Department of External Church 
Relations of the UOC, replacing Metropolitan Volodymyr’s secretary, Archbishop Aleksandr. This was 
an element of a plot devised by Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa. When this plot failed, Antonii 
had to resign from this post in May 2012. He has, however, remained a permanent member of the 
Synod and ‘in charge of the UOC’s affairs’, and is sui generis the prime minister of his Church.
Metropolitan Aleksandr Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky and Vyshneve, vicar of Kyiv Metropolis, was born 
Oleksandr Drabynko on 18 March 1977 in Korets (Rivne Oblast) to a civil servant’s family. After gra-
duation from secondary school, he studied at the Moscow Theological Seminary and the Kyiv The-
ological Academy. He graduated from the academy in 2002, and then, still as a layman, he became 
a host of a religious TV programme approved by the UOC. 
In 2006, he received holy orders as a priest and monk, and became Metropolitan Volodymyr’s perso-
nal secretary. He was also in charge of the UOC’s major media projects. He was consecrated bishop 
in 2007, and was promoted to archbishop three years later. At that time he was a serious candidate 
for the position ‘in charge of the UOC’s affairs.’ In 2011–2012 he chaired the interim commission in 
charge of the Kyiv eparchy and was responsible for the medical treatment of Volodymyr. He lost his 
positions after a conflict with Metropolitan Agafangel, and was removed from the Synod (which 
he had become a member of in 2011). He has remained in the shadows since then. He is one of the 
leaders of the pro-Ukrainian wing in the UOC, although he does not believe that achieving autoce-
phaly is the top priority. He is the youngest of the key bishops in the UOC. 
